Cost-Effectiveness of replacing culture test by Xpert MRSA screening test for patients at high risk of MRSA by Li, Jinshuo
57 
 
 
 
Cost-Effectiveness of replacing culture test by Xpert 
MRSA screening test for patients at high risk of MRSA 
 
 
 
Jinshuo Li 
 
 
Master thesis 
Institute of Health Management and Health Economics 
Faculty of Medicine 
 
UNIVERSITY OF OSLO 
18
th
 of August 2010 
  
1 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ........................................................................................................... 1 
FOREWORD ............................................................................................................................. 3 
ABBREVIATIONS .................................................................................................................... 4 
ABSTRACT ............................................................................................................................... 5 
1. INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 6 
1.1. Methicillin-Resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) .................................................................. 6 
2. EPIDEMIOLOGY .............................................................................................................. 9 
3. MRSA IDENTIFYING PROCEDURES .......................................................................... 12 
4. SCREENING STRATEGIES............................................................................................ 15 
4.1. Xpert MRSA test .........................................................................................................................15 
4.1.1. Day-time Xpert strategy .........................................................................................................16 
4.1.2. 24-hour Xpert strategy ...........................................................................................................16 
4.2. Culture test ................................................................................................................................16 
5. AIM ................................................................................................................................... 18 
6. METHODS ....................................................................................................................... 19 
6.1. Model .........................................................................................................................................19 
6.2. Probabilities ...............................................................................................................................20 
6.3. Costs...........................................................................................................................................23 
6.3.1. Labour Costs ..................................................................................................................24 
6.3.2. Material Costs ................................................................................................................25 
6.3.3. Capital Cost ....................................................................................................................27 
6.3.4. Summary of Costs ..........................................................................................................27 
6.4. Measure of Outcomes ...............................................................................................................29 
6.4.1. Time of preemptive isolation .........................................................................................29 
6.4.2. Unavailable Room-Hours ...............................................................................................31 
6.4.3. Quality-Adjusted Life......................................................................................................33 
6.5. Data Sources ..............................................................................................................................36 
7. RESULTS .......................................................................................................................... 37 
7.1. Costs...........................................................................................................................................37 
7.2. Outcomes ...................................................................................................................................38 
7.3. Cost-Effectiveness ......................................................................................................................38 
7.4. Sensitivity Analysis .....................................................................................................................39 
8. DISCUSSION ................................................................................................................... 44 
8.1. Strengths and weaknesses .........................................................................................................44 
8.2. Discussion of own findings ........................................................................................................46 
8.3. Findings in other studies ............................................................................................................48 
2 
 
8.4. Policy implications .....................................................................................................................49 
8.5. Conclusion..................................................................................................................................49 
9. REFERENCES ................................................................................................................. 50 
10. APPENDIX ....................................................................................................................... 55 
10.1. Variables Used in the Model ......................................................................................................55 
10.2. Probabilities ...........................................................................................................................63 
10.3. Original Costs Data .................................................................................................................64 
10.3.1. Labour Costs ..................................................................................................................64 
10.3.2. Material Costs ................................................................................................................65 
10.3.3. Capital cost .....................................................................................................................66 
10.3.4. Summary of Cost Calculations .......................................................................................67 
10.4. Original Health Benefits Data ................................................................................................68 
10.4.1. Time of Preemptive Isolation .........................................................................................68 
10.4.2. Health-Related Quality of Life ........................................................................................71 
10.5. Results in detail ......................................................................................................................75 
10.6. Sketch of a dynamic model ....................................................................................................76 
 
  
3 
 
FOREWORD 
As a Chinese student in an international Master program of Health Economics, Policy 
and Management, I was assigned internship at Oslo University Hospital, Ullevål in 2009.  At 
that time, a project about rapid screening test for Methicillin-Resistant Staphylococcus aureus 
(MRSA) was about to be implemented.  MRSA is a type of bacteria which has developed 
resistance to certain types of antibiotics.  It has accounted for considerable proportions of 
nosocomial infections all over the world in the recent few decades.  To combat this pathogen, 
one of the most effective strategies has been to screen high-risk patients accompanied with 
preemptive contact isolation.  Among all techniques used to detect MRSA, the conventional 
culture test has been the most accurate one.  The use of this test, however, means that it takes 
24-48 hours to verify the presence of the organism.  More recently, new screening techniques 
based on molecular biology have been developed and may allow the detection of MRSA 
within a couple of hours.  Oslo University Hospital, Ullevål (Oslo, Norway) introduced a 
screening test in 2009 —  Xpert MRSA.  This screening method could reduce the 
verification time of the pathogen to approximately 75 minutes.  Certainly, while the new 
screening tests may save use of hospital resources, speed up treatment for which the patient is 
admitted and increase patient satisfaction, it costs far more than the culture test.  The 
question is therefore whether the additional costs of Xpert MRSA are reasonable in relation to 
the benefits.  After six months of collecting cost and outcome data, through interviews, 
questionnaires and hospital information system, I tried to answer this question in the context 
of Oslo University Hospital, Ullevål. 
I am grateful for all assistance I have received from Kim Ulvin, at Oslo University 
Hospital, Ullevål, and Henrietta Biboh, in the same internship program with me, during the 
data collection period. 
My supervisor was Ivar Sønbø Kristiansen, MD PhD MPH, at The Department of Health 
Management and Health Economics, University of Oslo. 
  
4 
 
ABBREVIATIONS 
BSI Bloodstream Infection 
CA-MRSA Community-Associated Methicillin-Resistant Staphylococcus aureus 
EAC Equivalent Annual Cost 
HADS Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale 
HA-MRSA Healthcare-Associated Methicillin-Resistant Staphylococcus aureus 
HRQOL Health-Related Quality of Life 
MRSA Methicillin-Resistant Staphylococcus aureus 
MSSA Methicillin-Sensitive Staphylococcus aureus 
NOK Norwegian kroner 
PFGE Pulsed-field gel electrophoresis 
PVL Panton-Valentine Leucocidine 
QALD Quality-Adjusted Life Day 
QALY Quality-Adjusted Life Year 
QWB The Quality of Well-Being index 
SCC Squamous cell carcinoma 
SSI Surgical Site Infection 
US$ United States Dollar 
VAT Value Added Tax 
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ABSTRACT 
Background: Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) is a type of bacteria that 
does not react to certain antibiotics and has become the major cause of nosocomial infections.  
Both the treatments and precautions of MRSA add to the burden of infections caused by S. 
aureus.  To reduce the costs, Oslo University Hospital, Ullevål introduced the GeneXpert 
system to help accelerating the procedure of screening. 
Objective: The aim of the study was to estimate the additional costs and outcomes of 
replacing the current used screening strategy with new strategies which involved the 
GeneXpert system in patients at high risk of MRSA. 
Methods: We developed a decision model to represent the current strategy and two new 
strategies with the GeneXpert system, and measured costs and outcomes (length of 
preemptive isolation, number of unavailable room-hours, quality of life) for each of them. 
Results: While the cost of the current strategy was NOK16,984, the results showed that the 
new strategies were much less costly than the current used one (NOK7,360 and NOK3,690).  
The new strategies reduced the length of preemptive isolation and the number of unavailable 
room-hours and improved patients‟ quality of life.  The sensitivity analyses indicated that 
these results were not sensitive to reasonable changes in the model parameters. 
Conclusions: The new GeneXpert system represents a dominant strategy in that it reduces 
costs and improves outcomes under reasonable assumptions. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
As far as human history is recorded, infections have been a threat to human health.  
After the introduction of penicillin during last century, Staphylococcus aureus became spread 
in hospitals worldwide and replaced haemolytic streptococci as the major infecting organism.  
That started a long-term combat of antibiotic-resistant Staph. atreus. 
1.1. Methicillin-Resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) 
Source: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Public Health Image Library, USA 
MRSA, abbreviation of Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus, appeared first in the 
1960s soon after the introduction of new semi synthetic beta-lactamase-resistant penicillins 
such as methicillin and cloxacillin, which were developed to treat Staph. aureus.  The 
multi-resistant nature of MRSA made the new generation of antibiotics lose their 
effectiveness far more quickly than imagined.  As the time went by, the spread of MRSA 
withdrew for a while in the 1970s but soon came back dramatically in the 1980s. 
During the recent decades, MRSA has become a major cause of nosocomial infection 
Figure 1 SEM graph of MRSA 
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throughout the world but not replaced more susceptible Staph. aureus as a pathogen (Lowy 
1998).  Consequently, MRSA infections represent an addition to the infections caused by 
methicillin-sensitive strains.  Thus, a high incidence of MRSA adds to the overall burden of 
infections caused by S. aureus in hospitals (Herwaldt 1999). 
MRSA could be classified in two categories – healthcare associated MRSA (HA-MRSA) 
and community associated MRSA (CA-MRSA).  HA-MRSA strongly indicates previous 
contact with healthcare settings and long-term antibiotic use.  CA-MRSA differs from 
HA-MRSA in risk factors, high-risk populations, SCC type, PFGE type, toxins, PVL, 
antibiotic resistance pattern and associated clinical syndromes (Safdar, et al. 2008).  For a 
long time, HA-MRSA was the main concern on MRSA with rare exceptions.  However, 
several studies have documented the increasing danger of CA-MRSA recently (Kazakova, et 
al. 2005) (Herold, et al. 1998) (Anonymous 2003) (Campbell, et al. 2004) (Anonymous 
2006).  
Infections with MRSA could start as small, red skin “bumps” that resemble pimples.  
Generally, the bacteria remain on the skin, but they can also cause potentially life-threatening 
infections in bones, joints, surgical wounds, the bloodstream, heart valves, and lungs (Itani 
2008).  Moreover, CA-MRSA, unlike HA-MRSA, can produce a type of toxin, which is 
capable of causing severe, often fatal skin infections (necrotizing fasciitis) and pneumonia.  
According to the report from the SENTRY Antimicrobial Surveillance Program from United 
States and Canada in 2000, MRSA is responsible for 30% of surgical site infections (SSIs) 
(Rennie, et al. 2003).  Up to 30% of skin isolates from diabetic foot ulcers are confirmed as 
MRSA and lead to worse diabetic outcomes and longer hospital stay (Rogers, et al. 2008).  
Furthermore, diabetes is associated with persistent bacteremia in patients with MRSA, and 
MRSA bacteremia is associated with increased mortality compared with MSSA (methicillin 
sensitive Stahpylococcus aureus) bacteremia (Brunsvold, et al. 2008). 
In order to explore the association between MRSA and outcome, some researchers 
performed a meta-analysis to compare mortality rates among patients with bloodstream 
infection (BSI) caused by MRSA and MSSA.  Here, the odds for a fatal outcome are 
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consistently higher among patients with MRSA (odds ratio 1.56-2.20) and the association 
between MRSA and mortality persisted even when adjustments were made for severity of 
illness (Cosgrove, et al. 2003).  Although with some doubts (Zahar, et al. 2005), other 
studies have also reported excess mortality with MRSA infections (Chang, et al. 2003) 
(Ridenour, et al. 2006).  
The impact of MRSA on mortality is still controversial, but the costs of MRSA treatment 
are undoubtedly high, primarily due to the long hospital stays.  In one study, hospital costs 
attributable to MRSA bacteremia was almost twice as those of MSSA bacteremia (US$21,577 
vs. US$11,668) (Lodise, et al. 2005). 
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2. EPIDEMIOLOGY 
MRSA may be spread in different ways: a) having direct contact with another person‟s 
infection; b) sharing personal items, such as towels or razors, which have touched infected 
skin; c) touching surfaces or items, such as used bandages, contaminated with MRSA.  In a 
healthcare setting, the media of transmission could be hands, equipment and apparel of 
healthcare workers, and colonized patients are the main reservoir (Safdar, et al. 2008). 
Compared with countries elsewhere, the Scandinavian countries have had relatively low 
prevalence of MRSA due to intensive control (Fluit, et al. 2001).  In Norway, it has been 
under 1% for about 10 years (Anonymous 2009a).  However, according to the reported data 
from Norwegian Public Health Institute (Folkehelseinstituttet), even though the number of 
reported cases of MRSA is still relatively low, it has increased from 20 in 1999 to 783 in 2009, 
including both colonization and clinical infection.  Converting these numbers to incidence, it 
becomes a growth trend of MRSA in Norway (Figure 2). 
Figure 2 Incidence of MRSA in Norway (per 10,000 population) 
 
Sources: MRSA cases from Meldingssystem for smittsomme sykdommer (MSIS) and Population in 
Norway from Statistisk sentralbyrå 
Among patients admitted to hospital, there were approximately 14 persons with MRSA 
infection or colonization per 10,000 hospital admissions in 2008.  This number was 
approximately 10 times greater than the corresponding measure 10 years ago (Figure 3).  
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The incidence of MRSA has been higher in the capital city of Oslo than the rest of the country 
(Figure 4). 
Figure 3 Incidence of MRSA (per 10,000 admissions) in Norway 
Source: MRSA cases from Meldingssystem for smittsomme sykdommer (MSIS) and Population 
admitted in the last 12 months in Norway from Statistisk sentralbyrå 
 
Figure 4 Incidence of MRSA (cases per 10,000 population) in Oslo and the whole Norway 
 Sources: MRSA cases from Meldingssystem for smittsomme sykdommer (MSIS) and Population from 
Statistisk sentralbyrå 
During 1993-2006, 358 MRSA cases were registered in Oslo, of which 43.9% were 
detected at Oslo University Hospital, Ullevål, 21.2% in nursing homes, and 18.7% in primary 
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health care (Figure 5) (Andersen, et al. 2007).  The high number of reported MRSA cases at 
Oslo University Hospital, Ullevål mostly resulted from an increase of import-associated cases, 
and cases from primary healthcare.  With regard to the low prevalence and the preemptive 
isolation policy implemented in Norway, the fact that almost half of the cases were discovered 
at one hospital indicated much more pressure on controlling infectious diseases and utilizing 
health care resources at that hospital.  Referring the information system of the hospital, 
11803 MRSA tests were performed in 2009 but only 44 new MRSA cases were verified.  
This indicated that a considerable amount of resources were occupied by unnecessary 
preemptive isolation. 
Figure 5 Proportion of MRSA cases in Oslo, Norway 
 
(Andersen, Rasch and Syversen, Is an increase of MRSA in Oslo, Norway, associated with changed 
infection control policy? 2007) 
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3. MRSA IDENTIFYING PROCEDURES 
The way MRSA is transmitted implies that it is possible to break the infection chain by 
contact isolation.  Identification of patients likely to be colonized or infected with MRSA on 
admission is the key to promptly deploying contact isolation.  According to the guidelines 
for preventing MRSA at Oslo University Hospital, Ullevål (Anonymous 2009b), all patients 
that: 
 Have had contact with health care settings abroad during the last 12 months; or 
 Have had experience as health care personnel abroad during the last 12 months; or 
 Worked or stayed in orphanages, refugee camps or prisons abroad during the last 12 
months; or 
 Worked or stayed in asylums during the last 12 months; or 
 Have had a history of infected or colonized by MRSA, 
have to be preemptively isolated and screened for MRSA although in practice not all of them 
are isolated at hospital. 
While healthcare personnel take the medical history on admission, they are supposed to 
ask the questions above to identify patients at high risk of MRSA infection or colonization.  
Once a patient at high risk is identified, he or she takes MRSA detection test immediately.  
Nurses working in wards are responsible for collecting samples from patients, labeling them 
and ordering tests.  Based on indicators such as severity of underlying diseases, risk of 
severe infections and availability of home-care, some patients are sent home and self-isolated, 
and others are admitted to hospital and isolated in wards. 
Samples can be collected from several sites of human body, including nares, throat, 
hands and wrists, perineum, wounds/scars/eczema/skin lesions and all types of catheters.  
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Generally, samples from four different sites of the body are collected for each patient.  The 
sample from nares is always one of them.  The responsible personnel send the samples to the 
central laboratory for microbiologic examination.  The conventional way to verify MRSA is 
using culture test.  Routinely, culture plates are examined after 24 hours to give a 
preliminary result.  If the laboratory technician believes that the result will be positive, he or 
she can call the patient‟s ward.  MRSA treatment will start immediately.  When the 
preliminary test reading indicates that the result will be negative, no call to the wards is made. 
When MRSA cases are confirmed, the rooms in which the patients have stayed must be 
disinfected.  Even for unconfirmed cases, the patient rooms have to be disinfected each time 
the patients change room until they are declared as MRSA free.  The disinfection procedure 
is performed by cleaning robots and cleaning personnel.  It is complicated, taking 
approximately seven hours.  Two hours are for pre- and after-preparation by personnel, 
including transporting and cleaning the robots and sealing the rooms.  During the other five 
hours cleaning is performed automatically by robots (Table 1). 
Table 1 Time used to disinfect one hospital room 
 
Preemptive isolation does not completely cut patient‟s contact with those outside the 
room.  Since the reason for referral to hospital may not be MRSA infection, certain kinds of 
laboratory tests or physical examinations may be performed as appropriate.  Especially in the 
case of emergency cases, a patient will never stay in the emergency department for more than 
six hours unless the patient may die if he or she is moved out.  For these reasons, some 
patients may stay in more than one room, department or clinical examination unit during the 
whole period of isolation.  Such moves add to the number of rooms that eventually will need 
disinfection.  In some urgent cases, the therapy to the principle diagnosis keeps going and 
leads to several transfers and stays within a probably huge area. 
There are also screening procedures for healthcare personnel who have exposed to 
Item Transport time Preparing time Disinfecting by robot Cleaning the robot 
Time (hour) 0.5 1 4~5 1 
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contaminated environments.  Those procedures don‟t include preemptive isolation.  Instead, 
personnel are screened for MRSA risk factors and stay at home until bacteriologic result is 
known.  This practice is not evaluated in this study.  
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4. SCREENING STRATEGIES 
In consideration of potential harm of MRSA infections, preventive strategies are 
undoubtedly essential.  Preemptive isolation and screening test represent one of the most 
effective strategies to stop the spread of MRSA.  Nevertheless, considerable costs are 
incurred, and clinical facilities cannot be used to produce health benefits.  The costly efforts 
in MRSA negative patients have no impact on the spread of MRSA.  Because health care 
resources are limited, the optimal preventive strategy for MRSA depends on costs as well as 
benefits.  In order to reduce unnecessary consumption of resources, Oslo University Hospital, 
Ullevål started to adopt the use of Xpert MRSA method to screen patients at high risk of 
MRSA in July, 2009. 
4.1. Xpert MRSA test 
The rapid method Xpert MRSA test took use of the GeneXpert System.  It is a real-time 
PCR-based molecular testing system, which is highly automatic and needs only 75 minutes to 
produce the test result.  The system can provide PCR results by a connected computer 
without human injection.  Anyone can operate it after a brief learning period because of its 
integration and automation. 
The sensitivity and specificity, according to the limited data (n=410) at Oslo University 
Hospital, Ullevål, were 99% and 100% respectively.  In other studies, the sensitivity of Xpert 
MRSA test varied between 75% and 100% while the specificity varied from 92% to 100% 
(Andersen, et al. 2010) (Stürenburg 2009) (Kelly, et al. 2009) (Wolk, et al. 2009a) (Wolk, et al. 
2009b) (Rossney, et al. 2008).  Although this screening test is not perfect, it is believed to be 
sufficiently effective in ruling out true negative cases and thus saves unnecessary costs and 
shortens the period of isolation.  Furthermore, this new method is supposed to increase the 
satisfaction of patients as well.  Accordingly, we designed three screening strategies to 
explore the additional costs and benefits of the Xpert MRSA test in this study. 
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4.1.1. Day-time Xpert strategy 
At Olso University Hospital, Ullevål, the GeneXpert system is operated by staff at the 
microbiology laboratory.  With the day-time Xpert strategy, the Xpert MRSA test is operated 
from 8.00 to 14.15 o‟clock on weekdays (Anonymous 2009c).  Patients who are admitted 
before or after this time period have to be isolated immediately but tested in the next working 
day.  Each Xpert test is accompanied by a corresponding culture test.  Only when the Xpert 
test result is negative, the patient can be released from isolation.  Otherwise, patients are 
isolated until culture tests are negative. 
4.1.2. 24-hour Xpert strategy 
With the 24-hour Xpert strategy, the Xpert test was assumed to be performed 24 hours 
and 365 days.  Thus, waiting time would be avoided and the corresponding time and 
resource costs could possibly be reduced.  The microbiology laboratory considered that it 
had no capacity to perform more tests without expanding its staff.  A report from the 
department concluded that 7-9 additional full-time and part-time positions, equivalent to 4.25 
full-time positions, were needed to offer a 24 hours service.  This increased staffing would 
imply not only 24 hours Xpert test service, but also 24 hours culture test service.  Improved 
staffing would not be confined to run MRSA tests once it were implemented.  The additional 
staff members would also perform other tasks. 
4.2. Culture test 
The gold standard test for detecting MRSA is the conventional culture test, for which it 
takes on average 48 hours to receive the final result.  Nurses take the samples from the 
patients, while laboratory technicians handle the rest of the working process.  Working hours 
for the laboratory technicians is from 8.00 until 15.00 on weekdays.  No tests are performed 
during weekends. 
Compared with the culture test, the Xpert test entails higher capital and material costs.  
17 
 
Additionally, the 24-hour Xpert strategy requires additional laboratory work.  The advantage 
of the rapid screening test is the earlier availability of test results, which leads to reductions in 
the length of preemptive isolation among MRSA-negative patients.  In that way, resources 
may be saved.  The extent of cost savings will depend on how long the time of preemptive 
isolation is avoided with different strategies. 
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5. AIM 
Adopting a health care perspective, the aim of this study was to explore the additional 
costs, health-related consequences and other consequences of replacing culture test alone with 
culture test plus either day-time Xpert test or 24-hour Xpert test in patients at high risk of 
MRSA. 
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6. METHODS 
6.1. Model 
We developed a decision tree model with the computer program TreeAge Pro 2009.  
The model starts with patients at high risk of MRSA and has three strategies: 1) Culture test 
strategy; 2) Day-time Xpert strategy; and 3) 24-hour Xpert strategy (Figure 6). 
Figure 6 Decision Tree for Cost-Effectiveness Analysis 
 
With the culture test strategy, two branches, indicating positive result and negative result, 
are presented secondary to the chance node.  This is the conventional and current strategy. 
With the day-time Xpert strategy, the first chance node was followed by positive and 
negative results of the Xpert test.  Each of the two braches is followed by the results of 
confirmatory culture test.  If the Xpert test result is negative, the patient is released from 
isolation immediately.  Thus, time and costs of preemptive isolation are reduced, possibly 
also the cost of disinfection, without any adverse effect when the test result is true negative.  
If the Xpert test result is false negative (the corresponding culture test result is positive), 
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however, the risk of infecting other persons increases.  In that case, all persons who have had 
contact with the infected patient have to be isolated preemptively and screened, incurring 
additional costs. 
With the 24-hour Xpert strategy, the tree structure is the same as in the day-time Xpert 
strategy, but the model parameters are different (see Appendix 10.1).  The main difference is 
that, with the day-time Xpert strategy, patients suspected of MRSA who arrive in hospital 
during the evening and night, have to wait till next morning to have the tests.  Consequently, 
there is more waiting time and isolation with this strategy, but less laboratory labour costs. 
6.2. Probabilities 
The crucial test characteristics are sensitivity and specificity.  According to data 
collected at Oslo University Hospital, Ullevål during the period July 22
nd
, 2009 ~ Sept 15
th
, 
2009 and using culture test as the confirmatory test, the sensitivity of the Xpert test is 99% 
and the specificity is 100%.  We searched Medline using the keywords “Xpert” and “MRSA” 
to identify published studies of the Xpert MRSA test characteristics.  In total six studies were 
identified (Table 2, also see Appendix 10.2) (Rossney, et al. 2008) (Wolk, et al. 2009a) (Wolk, 
et al. 2009b) (Kelly, et al. 2009) (Anonymous n.d.) (Andersen, et al. 2010).   These data on 
sensitivity and specificity of the Xpert test were based on the comparison with culture tests 
using different kinds of agar.  Although culture tests may also produce false results, such 
tests are considered to represent valid verification of MRSA.  Given that the aim of this 
study was to explore the additional costs and consequences of replacing the culture test alone 
strategy with the Xpert strategies, the costs related to false negative or false positive results of 
culture test were disregarded because they are inevitable and occur with the same probability 
in all three strategies. 
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Table 2 Sensitivities and Specificities from different studies 
Sources Sensitivity Specificity 
Andersen, et al. 2010 87% 100% 
Anonymous n.d. 86% 95% 
Kelly, et al. 2009 
87% 94% 
75% 95% 
Wolk, et al. 2009a 
94% 93% 
86% 95% 
Wolk, et al. 2009b 
97% 96% 
98% 99% 
Rossney, et al. 2008 
88% 92% 
79% 94% 
90% 97% 
 
The mean sensitivity and specificity were 89% and 95%, respectively.  We used SPSS 
(Explore description) to estimate the 95% confidence intervals, which were 84%~94%, 
94%~97% respectively. 
The probability parameters used in the model were ProbXpertPosi, 
ProbCulNega_XpertNega and ProbCulPosi_XpertPosi.  ProbXpertPosi represents the 
probability of positive Xpert test result.  ProbCulNega_XpertNega and 
ProbCulPosi_XpertPosi are the predictive value negative and the predictive value positive.  
They were calculated by following formulas: 
Formula 1 
                                                                    
Formula 2 
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Formula 3 
                     
 
                      
                                                     
 
The prevalence of MRSA in this study was defined as the proportion of MRSA cases 
among the patients who were isolated preemptively at hospital for suspected MRSA.  In 
2009, 11,803 tests were ordered for patients at Oslo University Hospital, Ullevål according to 
the laboratory register system, among which 308 tests were ordered for retesting patients.  In 
11,459 MRSA suspects, approximately 70% were sent home and self-isolated, although exact 
figures are not available.  This left approximately 3,450 patients isolated preemptively at 
hospital.  Among these isolated patients, there were 44 new MRSA cases detected (Figure 7).  
The estimated prevalence of MRSA among MRSA suspects who were admitted to Oslo 
University Hospital, Ullevål, was therefore 1.3%.  Considering the uncertainty in the 
proportion of self-isolated patients among all suspected ones, we used 0.6%~2.0% as an 
uncertainty interval of the prevalence. 
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Figure 7 Use of culture test (MRSA) in 2009 at Oslo University Hospital, Ullevål 
 
6.3. Costs 
The costs related to the tests, preemptive isolation and disinfection were identified, 
quantified and valued.  The MRSA treatment is constant no matter which strategy is carried 
out.  Switching screening strategies won‟t change the treatment.  The costs of treating 
MRSA were therefore omitted from the model. 
The main cost components of the strategies were: labour costs, material costs and capital 
cost.  At the end of this section, for the purpose of easy understanding, they are presented by 
means of two tables: one for the cost of the tests and one for the cost of preemptive isolation.  
All costs were measured in 2009 Norwegian Kroner (NOK) (US$1.00 = NOK6.28). 
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6.3.1. Labour Costs 
Labour costs encompassed laboratory technicians who operated either of the tests, nurses 
who collected samples for the tests and cared for patients during the isolation period in the 
wards, and cleaning personnel who disinfected rooms.  We assumed that the preemptive 
isolation did not influence the physicians‟ use of time, and therefore, physician costs were not 
included in this analysis.  Data on the relevant wage rates including social security and 
holiday payments were collected from the hospital accounts.  Where appropriate, we added 
45% of the salary for out-of-hours working according to Norwegian labour payment 
agreements. 
As the culture test always accompanied the Xpert test, the labour costs of the tests in the 
Xpert strategies were the sum of the labour costs of the Xpert test and the labour costs of the 
culture test.  In order to obtain estimates of the use of time for the tests, we interviewed the 
director of the microbiology laboratory and two of his staff.  They provided information on 
the average working time for each of the tests (Table 3).  The mean wage rate of laboratory 
technicians was NOK289 including overtime payment, social security and holiday payment. 
Table 3 Working time used by technicians for each of the tests in the microbiology laboratory 
 
We interviewed three doctors and five nurses to obtain information on the use of nurse 
manpower during the isolation.  They stated that one nurse could only care for one single 
isolated patient and no other patients.  We therefore assumed that the labour costs of 
one-hour isolation was the full cost of one-hour nurse costs, and the total nurse costs 
increased linearly with the increasing number of hours of isolation.  There are hundreds of 
nurses at the hospital, and they have different work schedules.  Even in one department, their 
Procedure Culture test Xpert MRSA test 
Preparing work before 
tests operating 
2-5 min 20 min 
Predicting results after 
24 hours 
5-15 min — 
Getting results after 48 
hours 
5 min 0 min 
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payments may vary for several reasons.  It was not feasible to track specific individuals‟ 
payments for this study.  We therefore used the average cost of a nurse within the whole 
hospital (NOK217 per hour including overtime payment and other costs), and this estimate 
was used to value the labour costs in the wards.  The director of the cleaning department 
informed that the cleaning personnel used on average 2.5 hours in preparation for the robot 
cleaning and other work related to disinfecting potentially infected rooms.  The cleaning 
personnel never worked at night.  The average wage rate of cleaning personnel was NOK207 
per hour including social security and holiday payment, and this amount was adopted to value 
the labour costs of disinfection. 
6.3.2. Material Costs 
Material costs encompassed materials used during the sample collecting process and 
disposable materials used by healthcare personnel during the isolation period and during 
disinfections. 
With respect to sampling for MRSA tests, we based the cost data on the hospital‟s 
guidelines.  We consequently assumed that four swabs and four tubes were used for each 
suspected patient, in addition to one set of gown, gloves and respirators (Figure 8), which 
nurses have to wear when they collect samples.  The unit prices were taken from the hospital 
accounts. 
Figure 8 Nurse wearing gown, gloves and respirator 
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A wide range of materials are used in the microbiology laboratory for MRSA tests.  It 
was not feasible to collect information on all details here, and we only included the cost of the 
selective culture plate and the Xpert MRSA test package.  With respect to other materials, 
the costing was based on aggregate cost item in the hospital accounts, named disposable 
materials.  This item was NOK135,000 in 2009.  The cost of disposable materials for the 
tests in the Xpert strategies was the sum of the cost of disposable materials for the culture test 
and the Xpert test.  In order to allocate the costs to each test, working time was used as 
distribution factor by means of the following formula: 
Formula 4 
                                 
 
                              
                                                
                               
The annual person-hours were based on the number of full-time positions (31.5 in 2009) 
assuming 1,950 working hours per position per year.  With the 24-hour Xpert strategy, the 
total amount of disposable materials costs might increase but the disposable materials for each 
test would be the same as with the day-time Xpert strategy. 
According to the isolation rules, all persons entering an isolated room have to wear 
gloves, gowns and respirators as shown in Figure 8.  Each time this happens, a set of those 
materials are used.  We assumed that the physician see his/her patient twice per day while 
in isolation.  With respect to nurses, based on interviewing a nurse from orthopedic ward, 
we assumed 16 times of entering rooms per day including serving meals, helping personal 
hygiene, giving necessary medicine and other essential visits due to isolation. 
Disinfection requires considerable use of materials.  First, cleaning personnel has to 
wear cap, gloves, gown and respirator once they enter the room.  If they leave the room and 
later return, another set of suits is required.  The director of the cleaning department 
informed that the cleaning personnel uses 16 pairs of gloves, 2 caps, 2 gowns and 2 
respirators when cleaning one room.  For sealing the rooms prior to the robot cleaning, 1 
27 
 
roll of plaster, 1 roll of tape, 2 black and 4 yellow plastic bags, certain amount of soap and 
disinfection gas are consumed each time.  One bottle of soap could be used for 105 rooms.  
One bottle of disinfection gas could cover 320 m
2
.  All these items were accounted for 
material costs of disinfection. 
The costs of all types of materials listed above were valued according to market prices 
(NOK) as stated in the financial accounts of the hospital.  A detailed price list was presented 
in Appendix 10.3.2. 
6.3.3. Capital Cost 
Capital cost in this study encompassed the incubators for the culture test, the GeneXpert 
system and the robot for disinfection.  At Oslo University Hospital, Ullevål, an incubating 
room is used instead of several incubating boxes.  Because the number of MRSA culture 
tests is limited comparing with the total number of culture tests, the capital cost of the culture 
test was assumed to be zero.  The hospital has two GeneXpert Systems, one for patients and 
one for personnel.  In this study, only the system for patients was considered.  The price of 
this machine was stated in the purchase contract as NOK990,000 excluding VAT (Anonymous 
2009d).  It was assumed that the life time of the machine is 10 years.  The price of cleaning 
robots used for disinfection was NOK190,000 for each according to the records of the 
cleaning department.  The life time of the robots was assumed to be 3 years.  A 4% 
discount rate was adopted in the calculation of capital costs (Anonymous 2009e).  After 
depreciation, we got the equivalent annual cost (EAC), which was NOK152,572 for the 
GeneXpert system and NOK68,466 for the robots.  Capital cost per test = EAC/Annual 
number of MRSA tests.  Capital cost per disinfection = EAC/Annual number of times of 
using robots.  Details about depreciation are presented in the Appendix 10.3.3. 
6.3.4. Summary of Costs 
Based on the methods presented in section 6.3.1 – 6.3.3, the cost per culture test was 
NOK387, the cost per day-time Xpert test was NOK2,151 and the cost per 24-hour Xpert test 
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was NOK2,339 (Table 4).  With respect to the costs of preemptive isolation including 
disinfection, the cost per patient was NOK16,596 with the culture test strategy.  The cost per 
patient of preemptive isolation was NOK16,596 when the day-time Xpert test result was 
positive and NOK4,477 when it was negative.  With the 24-hour Xpert strategy, the cost per 
patient was NOK12,759 when the Xpert test result was positive while it was NOK639 when 
the result was negative (Table 5).  Details about the calculation of costs are presented in the 
Appendix 10.3.4. 
Table 4 Cost of tests (2009 Norwegian Kroner (NOK)) according to screening strategy 
    
Culture test 
(NOK) 
Day-time Xpert 
(NOK) 
24-hour Xpert 
(NOK) 
Labour cost per test 321 628 817   
Material cost per test 67 1,510 1,510   
Capital cost per test 0 13 13   
Cost per test 387 2,151 2,339   
 
Table 5 Costs per patient of preemptive isolation and disinfection (2009 Norwegian Kroner (NOK)) 
according to screening strategy 
    
Culture test 
(NOK) 
Day-time Xpert 
(NOK) 
24-hour Xpert 
(NOK) 
Result   Positive Negative Positive Negative 
Labour cost of 
preemptive isolation 
13,642 13,642 3,538 10,718 614 
Disinfection cost of 
preemptive isolation 
2,365 2,365 788 1,577 0 
Material cost during 
preemptive isolation 
589  589  150  464  25  
Cost of preemptive 
isolation 
16,596  16,596  4,477  12,759  639  
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6.4. Measure of Outcomes 
Three types of outcomes were used as measures of benefits: reduction in the length of the 
preemptive isolation, reduction in unavailable room-hours and quality–adjusted life. 
6.4.1. Time of preemptive isolation 
The time period of preemptive isolation started when samples were collected and ended 
when the test results were available.  This period of time encompassed collecting samples in 
wards, conveying samples to the microbiology laboratory, performing the tests and 
additionally, waiting time because the tests were not performed during night time. 
The time of collecting samples is same for all strategies because nurses in the wards use 
double pre-wet swabs (Figure 9) to collect samples for both tests simultaneously.  Given that 
there was no record on the length of this time period, we assumed it to be 10 minutes based on 
interviewing four nurses. 
Figure 9 Double pre-wet swabs 
 
Because of deficiencies of the laboratory register system, the information on the 
transport time from individual departments to the microbiology laboratory was not complete.  
According to the best register data we could get, the average time of transport was 3-7 
minutes. 
Operating time of the tests encompassed time of preparation, time of bacteria growing 
(the culture test) or reacting (the Xpert test) and time of verification (the culture test).  The 
director of the microbiology laboratory and two of his staff informed that it takes 2-5 minutes 
to prepare the culture test.  The time for the bacteria to grow is 48 hours.  The culture plate 
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is read twice during the 48 hours, the first after 24 hours and the second after 48 hours.  The 
first reading takes 5-15 minutes while the second one takes approximately 5 minutes.  The 
staff also informed that it takes approximately 20 minutes to prepare an Xpert test.  The 
reacting time for Xpert test is 75 minutes.  The verification report is presented automatically 
by a computer linked to the GeneXpert system so that there is no verification time.  When 
the Xpert test produced a positive result, however, the operating time of culture test was used 
to calculate the total time in the model instead of that time of the Xpert test.  In that case, all 
patients who got positive test results from the Xpert test continued to be isolated until the 
48-hour culture test result was available.  Given that the culture test and the Xpert test were 
performed simultaneously, the longer period of time was used to value the length of the 
preemptive isolation period. 
Waiting time was applied for the strategies of the culture test and the day-time Xpert test, 
but not for the 24-hour Xpert strategy.  In the former two strategies, samples were sent to the 
laboratory the next morning if they were collected later than 14.15 o‟clock.  Estimates of 
waiting time were based on the laboratory registration system of Oslo University Hospital, 
Ullevål.  In 2009, 11,803 MRSA tests were ordered.  Although 4,724 of those tests had no 
record on ordering time, the rest were registered every hour throughout the day (see Appendix 
10.4.1).  We analyzed the distribution of the length of waiting time in SPSS (Explore 
description) and got the mean (13.4 hours) of the length of waiting time.  The 95% 
confidence interval was 13.23-13.57. 
Based on the methods described in this section, the length of preemptive isolation was 
63.0 hours with the culture test strategy, 63.0 hours with the day-time Xpert strategy when the 
Xpert test result was positive and 16.3 hours when the result was negative.  The 24-hour 
Xpert strategy produced the shortest preemptive isolation period, which lasted 49.5 hours 
when Xpert test result was positive and 2.8 hours when result was negative (Table 6). 
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Table 6 The length of preemptive isolation (hours) according to screening strategy 
    
Culture test 
(hours) 
Day-time Xpert 
(hours) 
24-hour Xpert 
(hours) 
Result   Positive Negative Positive Negative 
Working time per test 
(nurse) 
0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
Transport time 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Time of test 49.2 49.2 2.6 49.2 2.6 
Waiting time for 
having test performed 
13.5 13.5 13.5 0.0 0.0 
Time of preemptive 
isolation 
63.0 63.0 16.3 49.5 2.8 
 
6.4.2. Unavailable Room-Hours 
As a standard approach to controlling infectious diseases, isolation rooms were supposed 
to be disinfected after each period of isolation.  In the case of preemptive isolation for 
preventing MRSA, if a room was used as an isolation room, either the patient was verified as 
MRSA positive or he/she was transferred to another room before being declared as MRSA 
free, the room has to be disinfected after the patient moved out.  The total unavailable 
room-hours due to preemptive isolation were defined as the sum of time of preemptive 
isolation and time of disinfection, during which period the room was occupied and not 
available to other patients.  The time of preemptive isolation was presented in the previous 
section.  The time of disinfection encompassed time of transporting the robots to the rooms, 
time of sealing the rooms and preparing the robots, time of disinfection by robots, and time of 
cleaning the robots after disinfection (Table 1).  While the robots worked, the cleaning staff 
performed other tasks. 
In a busy department, such as the emergency department, most patients are transferred to 
other departments within 6 hours.  That means that it‟s impossible to receive the culture test 
results before the MRSA suspects are moved to another ward or department.  All rooms used 
for isolating the suspected patients must be disinfected.  In addition, certain kinds of clinical 
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examinations and tests for the underlying diseases are performed during the isolation period.  
These facts in practice lead to more than one room disinfection during preemptive isolation.  
Generally, the longer a patient is isolated, the more rooms are used and the more disinfections 
are needed.  Based on the interviews with five doctors from different departments, we 
preliminarily assumed that the frequency of disinfection was once every 24 hours.  With 
reference to the director of the cleaning department, it takes on average 7 hours to disinfect 
one room.  Considering the time of preemptive isolation, the unavailable room-hours were 
84.0 hours (3.5 bed-days) with the culture test strategy.  The unavailable room-hours were 
84.0 hours (3.5 bed-days) with the day-time Xpert strategy when the Xpert test result was 
positive and 23.3 hours (1 bed-day) when the result was negative.  With the 24-hour Xpert 
strategy, the unavailable room-hours were 63.5 hours (2.6 bed-days) when the Xpert result 
was positive and only 2.8 hours (0.1 bed-days) when the result was negative. 
Table 7 Number of unavailable room-hours according to screening strategy 
    
Culture test 
(hours) 
Day-time Xpert 
(hours) 
24-hour Xpert 
(hours) 
Result   Positive Negative Positive Negative 
Time of preemptive 
isolation 
63.0 63.0 16.3 49.5 2.8 
Time of room 
disinfection by robot 
4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 
Working time per 
disinfection 
2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 
Number of room 
disinfection 
3 times 3 times 1 times 2 times 0 times 
Unavailable     
room-hours 
84.0 84.0 23.3 63.5 2.8 
 
In Table 7, “Time of room disinfection by robot” was the time that one robot used to 
disinfect a room.  “Working time per disinfection” encompassed time of transporting the 
robots to the rooms, time of sealing the rooms and preparing the robots before and after 
disinfection.  The number of room disinfection was dependent upon the length of preemptive 
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isolation and was assessed in sensitivity analyses. 
6.4.3. Quality-Adjusted Life 
In the base case, we assumed that isolation had no adverse effect on patients‟ diagnosis 
and treatment.  With reference to the interviews with five doctors from different hospital 
departments, treatment of underlying diseases was postponed only if it was considered 
unharmful to patients‟ health.  Contact isolation may however affect patients‟ feelings and 
well-being to a smaller or greater extent.  Consequently, we assumed that preemptive 
isolation may have an impact on mental health and health-related quality of life (HRQOL).  
Due to time and resource constraints of this study, we were unable to measure preferences for 
preemptive isolation.  Consequently, we chose to use data from published studies. 
We searched PubMed with the keywords “isolation AND utility”, “seclusion AND 
utility”, “isolation AND preference” “seclusion AND preference” and “isolation AND quality 
of life AND infection”, and identified three articles about HRQOL in patients in isolation due 
to infection.  One article explored the impact of isolation in an older adult population (Tarzi, 
et al. 2001).  The other two measured levels of anxiety and depression in patients in isolation, 
one for long-term (Catalano, et al. 2003) and the other for short-term isolation (Wassenberg, 
et al. 2010).  Because the target population in this study was not constrained to older adult 
and the isolation period was approximately two or three days, we discarded the former two 
articles and took advantage of the last one (Wassenberg, et al. 2010).  The authors adopted 
the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS) to measure the anxiety and depression the 
patients experienced in isolation and compared them with common patients.  HADS is a 
questionnaire containing 14 questions with four levels of points for each one (0-3).  Half of 
the questions are about anxiety and the rest are about depression.  The maximum of the 
points for each section is 21.  The results of HADS for isolated patients and non-isolated 
patients were 5.0 (3.0-7.0) and 4.5 (2.0-6.0) for anxiety while 5.0 (3.0-7.0) and 4.0 (3.0-7.3) 
for depression.  Taking use of the formula that HRQOL = 1 – points / 21, we calculated the 
HRQOLs which were 0.76 (both anxiety and depression) for isolated patients and 0.79 
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(anxiety) and 0.81 (depression) for non isolated patients. 
On the basis of this study, we assumed that the HRQOL was 0.80 of non-isolated patients 
and of isolated patients was 0.76.  In order to make all strategies comparable, we adopted the 
time scale from 0 to 63 hours for all strategies to measure HRQOL.  Based on these 
assumptions, Quality-Adjusted Life Days (QALDs) and subsequently Quality-Adjusted Life 
Years (QALYs) were calculated under different conditions.  Loss of QALDs and QALYs was 
presented with minus value.  For example, when the Xpert test produced a false negative 
result in the 24-hour Xpert strategy, the value of HRQOL was 0.76 from 0 to 2.8 hours 
because of preemptive isolation and suspected MRSA.  The Xpert test produced a false 
negative result in 2.8 hours so that HRQOL went back to and remained 0.80 from 2.8 to 49.5 
hours.  The culture test produced a positive result after 49.5 hours, and therefore HRQOL 
became 0.76 again from 49.5 to 63.0 hours (Figure 10).  In this case, the total value of 
HRQOL was                                                     .  
QALDs were              QALDs and QALYs were                      
QALYs. 
Figure 10 Health-Related Quality of Life (HRQOL) when Xpert test produced a false negative 
result in the 24-hour Xpert strategy 
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(5.5*10
-3
 QALYs ) were gained, regardless of the result.  With the day-time Xpert strategy, 
1.99 QALDs (5.5*10
-3
 QALYs) were gained when the Xpert test result was positive, 
regardless of the culture test result.  Similarly, when the day-time Xpert test produced 
negative results, 2.07 QALDs (5.7*10
-3
 QALYs) were gained, regardless of the culture test 
results.  When the 24-hour Xpert test produced a true result, 1.99 QALDs (5.5*10
-3
 QALYs) 
(true positive) and 2.09 QALDs (5.7*10
-3
 QALYs) (true negative) were gained respectively.  
2.02 QALDs (5.5*10
-3
 QALYs) were gained when the 24-hour Xpert test produced a false 
positive result.  2.07 QALYs (5.7*10
-3
 QALYs) were gained when the 24-hour Xpert test 
produced a false negative result (Table 8, also see Appendix 10.4.2). 
Table 8 The number of Quality Adjusted Life Days (QALDs) and Quality Adjusted Life Years 
(QALYs) during the 63 hours observation period, according to test result 
Test Results QALDs QALYs 
Culture test positive 1.99 5.5*10
-3
 
Culture test negative 1.99 5.5*10
-3
 
True positive daytime 
Xpert test 
1.99 5.5*10
-3
 
False positive daytime 
Xpert test 
1.99 5.5*10
-3
 
False negative daytime 
Xpert test 
2.07 5.7*10
-3
 
True negative daytime 
Xpert test 
2.07 5.7*10
-3
 
True positive 24-hour 
Xpert test 
1.99 5.5*10
-3
 
False positive 24-hour 
Xpert test 
2.02 5.5*10
-3
 
True negative 24-hour 
Xpert test 
2.09 5.7*10
-3
 
False negative 24-hour 
Xpert test 
2.07 5.7*10
-3
 
 
The threshold for willingness-to-pay per QALY in Norway was NOK 500,000, and this 
value was adopted in this study if applicable. 
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6.5. Data Sources 
All the data on costs were taken from the accounts of the Oslo University Hospital, 
Ullevål, including the hospital‟s information system, contracts, etc.  The data on wage rates 
and full-time positions were referred to the accounts and the annual report of Oslo University 
Hospital, Ullevål.  All the data on time was collected through interviewing relevant 
personnel, by face-to-face interview and questionnaire. 
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7. RESULTS 
7.1. Costs 
The expected total cost of the strategies were NOK16,984, NOK7,360 and NOK3,690 
per patient with the culture test, the day-time and the 24-hour Xpert strategies, respectively 
(Figure 11).  Although the costs per patient were high when the Xpert MRSA test result was 
false negative (NOK35,896 with the day-time Xpert strategy and NOK17,650 with the 
24-hour Xpert strategy), the total costs of the Xpert strategies were still lower than those of 
the culture test strategy because of the low probability of a false negative test (0.1%). 
Figure 11 Costs according to screening strategy 
 
With respect to the cost of the culture test strategy, out of NOK16,984, NOK13,963 
represented labour costs.  The next largest cost component was disinfection (NOK2,365) 
followed by material (NOK656), and there was no capital cost.  In the Xpert strategies, 
labour costs represented NOK4,769 for day-time testing and NOK2,018 for 24-hour testing.  
Here, material costs represented NOK1,695 and NOK1,569, respectively.  Disinfection costs 
appeared to be smaller in the Xpert strategies (NOK883 and NOK90, respectively).  Capital 
cost was NOK13 per patient in both of the Xpert strategies (Table 9). 
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Table 9 Cost components of the three strategies 
Costs 
Culture test 
(NOK) 
Daytime Xpert 
(NOK) 
24-hour Xpert 
(NOK) 
Labour costs 13,963 4,769 2,018 
Material costs 656 1,695 1,569 
Disinfection costs 2,365 883 90 
Capital cost 0 13 13 
Total 16,984 7,360 3,690 
 
7.2. Outcomes 
The average time of preemptive isolation was shortest (5.5 hours) with the 24-hour Xpert 
strategy while it was longest (63.0 hours) with the culture test strategy, representing 
reductions in the length of the preemptive isolation of 57.5 hours with the 24-hour Xpert 
strategy and 43.9 hours with the day-time Xpert strategy.  The number of unavailable 
room-hours was 6.3 hours with the 24-hour Xpert strategy, 26.9 hours with the day-time Xpert 
strategy and 84.0 hours with the culture test strategy.  The QALYs gained by replacing the 
strategy of culture test alone with the 24-hour Xpert strategy was 3.0*10
-4
 QALYs (0.11 
QALDs), while it was 2.4*10
-4
 QALYs (0.09 QALDs) with the day-time Xpert strategy. 
7.3. Cost-Effectiveness 
The culture test strategy had the highest costs and the least favorable outcome for all 
three outcomes, and it was thus dominated by the day-time Xpert strategy.  This however, 
had higher costs and worse outcomes than the 24-hour Xpert strategy.  By replacing the 
culture test strategy with the 24-hour Xpert strategy, NOK13,294 could be saved, 57.5 hours 
unnecessary preemptive isolation could be avoided, 77.7 room-hours could be freed and 
3.0*10
-4
 QALYs (0.11 QALDs) could be gained.  In conclusion, the 24-hour Xpert strategy 
was dominant in the base case analysis (Figure 12, also see Appendix 10.5).  Assuming that 
3,500 patients were screened and isolated preemptively per year, NOK46,529,000 might be 
saved by replacing the culture test strategy with the 24-hour Xpert strategy.  In addition, on 
average 271,950 unavailable room-hours (11,331 bed-days) might be saved and 1.05 
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additional QALYs could be produced during one year. 
Figure 12 Cost-effectiveness plane using QALYs as the measure of effectiveness (the culture test 
strategy is in the origin of the graph) 
 
7.4. Sensitivity Analysis 
One-way sensitivity analyses were performed on all model parameters, and the most 
important findings are presented in Table 10.  Only changing the annual number of MRSA 
suspects could change the conclusion that the Xpert strategies dominated the culture test 
strategy (Figure 13).  Except for this parameter, in all other cases, the 24-hour Xpert strategy 
dominated over the daytime Xpert strategy, and the culture test strategy was dominated by 
both of the others. 
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Table 10 Some important parameters for sensitivity analyses 
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Figure 13 Sensitivity Analysis: Expected cost per patient according to the annual number of MRSA 
suspected patients 
 
If the annual number of suspected MRSA cases was below 12 per year and all of them 
were isolated at hospital, the costs of both Xpert strategies outnumbered the costs of the 
culture test only strategy, but produced more favourable outcomes.  With more than 12 
suspected MRSA patients annually, the 24-hour Xpert strategy appeared to be less costly than 
the culture test alone strategy but produced better outcomes.  The equivalent threshold for 
the day-time Xpert strategy was 16.  In reality, 70% of the patients with suspected MRSA 
infection or colonization were isolated at home which is much less costly.  Taking account of 
70% home isolation, the 24-hour Xpert strategy would be less costly than the culture test 
strategy when the annual number of suspected MRSA cases was more than 59 (Figure 14). 
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Figure 14 Sensitivity analysis: The total costs according to the number of suspected MRSA cases 
 
With only one MRSA suspects per year, the cost per QALY would be much greater than 
the commonly recommended threshold for willingness-to-pay in Norway (NOK500,000) 
(Figure 15).  Only if the annual number of suspected MRSA cases were more than 59 for the 
24-hour Xpert strategy or more than 93 for the day-time Xpert strategy, these strategies would 
be  considered cost-effective. 
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Figure 15 Sensitivity analysis: Cost-effectiveness with one and with 15,000 suspected cases of 
MRSA per year (the culture test strategy is in the origin of the graph) 
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8. DISCUSSION 
The results of this study indicate that the 24-hour Xpert strategy has lower costs and 
better outcomes than the two others under a wide range of assumptions. 
8.1. Strengths and weaknesses 
This study was based on a wide range of input data, most of which were uncertain.  In 
fact, the Treeage model had 39 parameters.  In the following, we will focus on some 
parameters that are particularly uncertain. 
It is difficult to value the labour costs during preemptive isolation partly because we lack 
accurate records on type, wage rate and amount of relevant staff.  As far as we know, nurses 
usually take responsibility for more than only one patient when he or she is on duty.  That 
means that the labour costs we used in the base case analysis may be overestimated, but the 
sensitivity analysis indicate that realistic changes in labour costs will not change the 
conclusion keeping the other parameters constant. 
Although MRSA may be overlooked even by use of culture test (Struelens, et al. 2009), 
the risk of false negative test results is believed to be greater with the Xpert MRSA test.  
False negative results may mean spread of MRSA and increased burden of the disease.  The 
uncertainty of such effects may have been underestimated in the current model which means 
that the benefits from the Xpert strategies could be overestimated. 
Because our model was static, we did not account for the fact that preemptive isolation 
may reduce the prevalence of MRSA carrying in the population.  To the extent that the 
isolation reduces the prevalence, we have underestimated the effectiveness of the rapid 
screening test.  In contrast, if the sensitivity of the GeneXpert system were much less than 
100%, we have overestimated the effectiveness.  In the appendix we present a dynamic 
model that could be used to estimate herd effects. 
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There is no direct information about how many times of disinfection are performed for 
each patient with suspect of MRSA infection or colonization.  We assumed that the number 
of disinfections depends on the length of preemptive isolation.  In reality, the number of 
disinfections depends on the patients‟ medical condition and its treatment and diagnostics.  
The number can vary considerably across, which makes the number of disinfections quite 
uncertain. 
There is evidence that contact isolation influences patients‟ quality of life (Gammon 
1999).  Because we lack own data on quality of life, we used data from a previous study 
(Wassenberg, et al. 2010).  Here, the data are uncertain, but fortunately, the sensitivity 
analyses indicate that the conclusion is not sensitive to the assumptions we made in this 
respect. 
The analysis included costs and benefits related to patients, but not to staff members.  
Even staff members are isolated (at home) when they are suspected of having MRSA 
infection or colonization.  Using Xpert MRSA test implies shorter isolation periods for them 
as well, but this benefit was omitted from the analysis, and this will bias the total benefits 
from the Xpert strategies down. 
There is some evidence that doctors avoid contacting patients who are suspected of 
MRSA infection or colonization (Halcomb, et al. 2002).  There is even evidence that such 
patients have poorer outcomes than others (Chang, et al. 2003) (Ridenour, et al. 2006).  
Reduced isolation time could therefore improve patients‟ outcomes.  Lacking hard evidence, 
such aspects were omitted from the model. 
A strength of this study is the large number of information pieces that were collected 
through interviews and through hospital records.  It is impossible to overview all the data, 
and a decision model is a tool to handle all the data in a logic way. 
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8.2. Discussion of own findings 
The base case analysis indicated that the most important cost-driver in all three strategies 
was labour costs.  In the culture test strategy, approximately 83% of the total costs were 
attributable to labour costs.  This proportion appeared to be lower in the Xpert strategies (65% 
with the day-time Xpert strategy and 54% with the 24-hour Xpert strategy).  The reduction 
was associated with the length of isolation period because the labour costs of caring patients 
during isolation represented a large proportion of the total labour costs.  With the culture test 
strategy, disinfection costs were the second largest component.  In contrast, disinfection 
costs and material costs were the second largest cost component with both Xpert strategies.  
Labour costs and material costs accounted for 98% of the total costs of the 24-hour Xpert 
strategy.  Even though the material costs of the Xpert strategies were approximately three 
times that of the material costs of the culture test strategy, the large reduction of other 
components, mainly labour costs, still made the Xpert strategies less costly.  This fact 
indicates that the relative magnitude of staff costs versus material costs determines whether 
the culture test or the Xpert strategies are most cost-effective.  However, regarding the costs 
saving, what should be kept in mind is that those costs will not be saved literally because 
nurses and laboratory technicians are still there and get paid.  What we called „save‟ here 
actually means that the human power resources are freed from one job and can do other 
presumably beneficial work.  The hospital budget will not be reduced, but treatment capacity 
will be higher. 
The interviews indicate that the reduction of unavailable room-hours could be more 
important in practice than we have imagined.  If patients with suspected MRSA infection or 
colonization need to be isolated at hospital while there is no available room, the patients have 
to lie on a bed in the hallway.  If such patients test positive, the whole area will be blocked 
and disinfected, and all the persons who have stayed there and can be traced will be screened 
and isolated.  Such interventions not only increase unavailable room-hours but impact the 
whole prevention system.  It implies that, to some extent, using Xpert MRSA test can 
produce more positive outcomes than what we identified in this study. 
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During the information collection phase we realized that other factors can influence the 
overall effect of all the strategies.  The first one is the number of patients at high risk of 
MRSA infection or colonization which are isolated preemptively.  According to the 
guidelines, personnel in patient reception unit are responsible for preliminarily selecting 
patients for MRSA screening.  However, no matter how strict the guidelines are, there is 
always a possibility that MRSA cases are lost due to carelessness or system deficiencies.  If 
the quality of the preliminary selection is poor, it will weaken the strength of any strategy 
preventing MRSA.  The compliance of contact isolation is another factor related to the effect 
of prevention.  We assumed in this study that both patients and healthcare personnel were 
100% compliant with the isolation rules.  In practice, however, the level of compliance 
fluctuates from hospital to hospital and varies with the length of the isolation period.  
Although the conclusion of this study is unlikely to change for this reason, the overall effect 
of the prevention of MRSA is probably influenced.  Furthermore, we also realized that not 
everyone agrees on the great importance of MRSA.  Some insist that it‟s important to keep 
the low prevalence in Norway and it will be too late when it rises up.  But some doctors feel 
the hospital and the government have paid too much attention on MRSA, and resources could 
have been spent better elsewhere.  As the prevalence of MRSA in Norway has increased 
during last two decades, one may questions if it is realistic to only protect Norway in the 
current globalized environment.  The argument is still out there and that is beyond the extent 
of this study. 
The conclusion of this study is relevant primarily for Norway, or more specifically, for 
Oslo University Hospital, Ullevål.  This is because differences in prevalence of MRSA, 
policies of preventing MRSA, wage rates and environments of health settings impact the 
results.  Any change in these factors will make differences on the components and the 
amounts of costs and outcomes.  For example, if there were no preemptive isolation 
accompanied with screening tests, the total costs would be far lower than in this study so that 
the conclusion could be completely different.  In countries such as the Nordic ones with 
similar prevalence, health care systems and cost structure, the GeneXpert system is likely to 
represent dominant strategies. 
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8.3. Findings in other studies 
We identified six studies that reported the sensitivity and specificity of the Xpert MRSA 
test.  One of them was a review and one included not only the Xpert MRSA test but also 
other rapid tests.  These studies used traditional culture growth method as the gold standard 
and classified sensitivities and specificities by which location of body the samples coming 
from.  The studies generally showed that the specificities lie in the range 92%-99.6% while 
the sensitivities lie in the range 75%-98.3% (Andersen, et al. 2010) (Anonymous n.d.) (Kelly, 
et al. 2009) (Wolk, et al. 2009a) (Wolk, et al. 2009b) (Rossney, et al. 2008).  Five of them 
only focused on the evaluation of Xpert MRSA assays but one also concerned cost. 
One cost study of day-time Xpert MRSA test from Oslo University Hospital, Ullevål 
measured costs for patients as well as healthcare workers (Andersen, et al. 2010).  The 
period of isolation (for patients) and leave (for healthcare personnel) were both assumed to be 
three days.  Among 41 healthcare workers and 51 patients with suspected MRSA infection 
or colonization, the Xpert MRSA test saved €895 per healthcare personnel and €502 per 
patient.  The study did not present details of the cost estimates, and no outcome data were 
included. 
With respect to quality of life, three studies targeting psychological impact of isolation 
due to infection were identified (Tarzi, et al. 2001) (Catalano, et al. 2003) (Wassenberg, et al. 
2010).  One of them targeted older adult population and used the Abbreviated Mental Test 
Score, the Barthel Index, The Geriatric Depression Scale-Short form and the Profile of Mood 
States to measure the impact (Tarzi, et al. 2001).  The mean score of the isolated group was 
15 and 8.6 of the non-isolated group (Catalano, et al. 2003).  Another study targeted 
hospitalized patients and used Hamilton Anxiety Rating Scale and Hamilton Depression 
Rating Scale.  The authors performed a study with 1-week and 2-week follow-up.  The 
study showed that patients in isolation had significantly higher scores on both the anxiety and 
depression scales at the time of follow-up than did patients who were not isolated but the 
difference was not significant.  The third study measured psychological impact of short-term 
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isolation in hospital patients with Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (Wassenberg, et al. 
2010).  This study indicated that the short-term isolation do not influence the hospitalized 
patients‟ levels of anxiety and depression. 
8.4. Policy implications 
The results of this study indicate that hospitals with more than 59 MRSA suspected 
patients per year may do well in using Xpert MRSA test on 24-hour basis accompanied with 
the culture test.  It should be noted, however, that this conclusion rest on labour savings from 
less preemptive isolation, and the budget impact of the Xpert strategies may be small if the 
hospital management does not reduce nurse staffing. 
Even though this study concluded that a switch to the Xpert strategies may be favourable 
for larger hospitals, still some pieces of information are uncertain.  Further research in the 
area should therefore focus on the sensitivity and specificity of the Xpert MRSA test and the 
impact of contact isolation for hospitalized patients on HRQOL. 
8.5. Conclusion 
The results of this study indicate that using the Xpert MRSA test on 24-hour basis 
accompanied with the culture test is more effective and less costly than using the culture test 
alone even for low number of MRSA suspected patients.  
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10. APPENDIX 
10.1. Parameters Used in the Model 
Table 11 Parameters in Decision Tree 
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Table 12 Calculation formulas for payoffs according to the culture test strategy 
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Table 13 Calculation formulas for payoffs according to the day-time Xpert strategy 
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 Table 14 Calculation formulas for payoffs according to the 24-hour Xpert strategy 
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10.2. Probabilities 
From July 22
nd
 to Sept 15
th
, there were 410 pairs of tests (both culture and rapid tests for 
each person).  As the culture test was regarded as the golden standard, the results of culture 
tests were used as the reference.  Then, the specificity of the rapid test was 98.77% and 
sensitivity was 100.00%. 
Table 15 Xpert test results using culture test as the reference 
 
Table 16 Statistics of sensitivities and specificities from 6 identified studies and data collected at 
Oslo University Hospital, Ullevål 
 Statistic Std. Error 
Sensitivity Mean .88749 .021711 
  95% 
Confidence 
Interval for 
Mean 
Lower Bound .84238   
  Upper Bound .93795   
  Median .87500   
  Variance .006   
  Std. Deviation .075207   
  Minimum .750   
  Maximum 1.000   
Specificity Mean .954029 .0072292 
  95% 
Confidence 
Interval for 
Mean 
Lower Bound .941147   
  Upper Bound .972970   
  Median .949000   
  Variance .001   
  Std. Deviation .0250426   
  Minimum .9200   
  Maximum .9960   
positive negative Total 
Xpert MRSA 
positive 
2 5 7 
Xpert MRSA 
negative 0 403 403 
Total 2 408 410 
Culture Culture 
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10.3. Original Costs Data 
10.3.1. Labour Costs 
Table 17 Cost of microbiologist in laboratory 
 
Table 18 Cost of nurses 
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10.3.2. Material Costs 
Table 19 Material cost of tests 
Name Per unit 
Swab & Tube 
Selective culture plate 
MRSA package 
NOK1.77 
NOK11.10 
NOK360.00 
 
Table 20 Unit cost of respirator, gown, gloves and cap 
 
Table 21 Material cost of disinfection 
Material for disinfection 
1 plaster + 1 tape NOK1,018.75 
Number of rooms covered 105 
Cost per room NOK9.70 
1 bottle of gas NOK500.00 
m
3
 covered 320 
m
3
 per room 48 
Cost per room NOK75.69 
1 role of black plastic bag NOK56.73 
1 role of yellow plastic bag NOK43.75 
Units per role 48 
Units of black plastic bag per room 2 
Units of yellow plastic bag per room 4 
Cost per room NOK6.01 
1 bottle of soap NOK14.80 
Number of rooms covered 105 
Cost per room NOK0.14 
2 gowns per room NOK11.54 
2 masks per room NOK2.21 
2 caps per room NOK1.00 
16 pairs of gloves per room NOK90.56 
Cost per room NOK105.31 
Total cost per room NOK196.85 
 
Name Per unit 
Respirators 1.11 NOK      
Gowns 5.77 NOK      
Gloves 5.66 NOK      
Caps 0.50 NOK      
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10.3.3. Capital cost 
GeneXpert System was accounted a technical installment in building in this study.  
According to the Budget 2009 (Anonymous 2009), it was in group j which gained a 10% 
depreciation rate.  The discount rate has kept being 4% in the last few years in Norway.  
Finally, mva (market value added) is 25% in Norway. 
Table 22 Cost of GeneXpert System 
 
EAC = 1237500/8.1109 = NOK152,572.46 
Capital cost per test = 
   
                          
  
         
     
 = NOK12.93 
Price of each cleaning robot = NOK190,000.00 
EAC = 190000/2.7751 = NOK68,466.00 
Quoting the director of cleaning department at Oslo University Hospital, Ullevål, the 
average number of using robots was approximately 77 per month.  Even though not all of 
them resulted from MRSA-related isolation, the average share was the same.  Capital cost 
per disinfection = 
   
     
  
     
   
 = NOK74.10 
GeneXpert System 
Price 1,980,000.00 NOK       
Volume 2 
Price per unit 990,000.00 NOK        
mva 25% 
Cost per unit 1,237,500.00 NOK       
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10.3.4. Summary of Cost Calculations 
Table 23 Detail numbers used in the cost calculations of tests 
 
The extra number under “Xpert MRSA test (24-hour)” was the labour cost per working 
hour of night duty in the laboratory.  Cost per test (laboratory) =           
  
    
         = NOK781 
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Table 24 Detail numbers of cost calculations of preemptive isolation 
 
10.4. Original Health Benefits Data 
10.4.1. Time of Preemptive Isolation 
According to the laboratory register system, 11,803 MRSA tests were ordered in 2009 
for patients.  Among these tests, 4,724 tests were not registered by time they were ordered.  
The graph following showed the distribution of the rest 7,079 tests according to ordering time. 
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Figure 16 Distribution of MRSA tests ordering at Oslo University Hospital, Ullevål (2009) 
 
In the rest 7,079 tests, 4,589 tests were ordered within working time (8.00~14.15), 
leading to 2,490 tests would maintain waiting time from 0.5 hours to 17.375 hours. 
Figure 17 Distribution of cases according to how long they waited for tests 
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Table 25 Frequency of cases according to waiting hours 
Waiting time (hours) Number of cases 
17.375 481 
16.5 473 
15.5 253 
14.5 242 
13.5 172 
12.5 144 
11.5 188 
10.5 106 
9.5 67 
8.5 100 
6.5 38 
5.5 47 
4.5 37 
3.5 27 
2.5 21 
1.5 30 
0.5 64 
Total 2490 
 
Table 26 Statistics of waiting time 
Statistics 
 
Value 
Mean of waiting time 
 
13.40 
 
Lower bound 13.23 
 
Higher bound 13.57 
Variance 
 
18.63229 
S.D 
 
4.316514 
Median 
 
14.5 
 
25% 11.5 
 
75% 16.5 
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10.4.2. Health-Related Quality of Life 
Figure 18 Health-Related Quality of Life (HRQOL) when Xpert MRSA test produced a true positive 
result in the day-time Xpert strategy 
 
HRQOLs of the culture test strategy (regardless of results) were the same as Figure 18. 
Figure 19 Health-Related Quality of Life (HRQOL) when Xpert MRSA test produced a false 
positive result in the day-time Xpert strategy 
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Figure 20 Health-Related Quality of Life (HRQOL) when Xpert MRSA test produced a false 
negative result in the day-time Xpert strategy 
 
Figure 21 Health-Related Quality of Life (HRQOL) when Xpert MRSA test produced a true 
negative result in the day-time Xpert strategy 
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Figure 22 Health-Related Quality of Life (HRQOL) when Xpert MRSA test produced a true positive 
result in the 24-hour Xpert strategy 
 
Figure 23 Health-Related Quality of Life when Xpert MRSA test produced a false positive result in 
the 24-hour Xpert strategy 
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Figure 24 Health-Related Quality of Life (HRQOL) when Xpert MRSA test produced a false 
negative result in the 24-hour Xpert strategy 
 
Figure 25 Health-Related Quality of Life (HRQOL) when Xpert MRSA test produced a true 
negative result in the 24-hour Xpert strategy 
 
QALYs were calculated as: 
Formula 5 
             
                                       
  
 
Formula 6 
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10.5. Results in detail 
Table 27 Cost-Effective Analysis when all options referred to the option "culture test " as a common 
baseline with time of preemptive isolation as outcome 
 
Table 28 Cost-Effective Analysis when all options referred to the option "culture test " as a common 
baseline with unavailable room-hours as outcome 
 
Table 29 Cost-Effective Analysis when all options referred to the option "culture test " as a common 
baseline with QALYs gained as outcome 
 
Table 30 Cost-Effectiveness Analysis when all options referred to the option "culture test " as a 
common baseline with QALDs gained as outcome 
 
To calculate the threshold of annual number of MRSA tests, we assumed that of all 
patients with suspected MRSA infection or colonization, 30% were isolated preemptively at 
hospital.  We hypothesized that the annual number of MRSA suspects was X and built three 
functions of X. 
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Formula 7 Function of Annual number of MRSA tests in the culture test only strategy 
              
Formula 8 Function of Annual number of MRSA tests in the Day-time Xpert MRSA test strategy 
                     
Formula 9 Function of Annual number of MRSA tests in the 24-hour MRSA test strategy 
                     
 
10.6. Sketch of a dynamic model 
In the discussion section, we suggested to use a dynamic model to estimate the herd 
effect resulting from the new screening strategy.  Hereby, we presented the preliminary 
version of the model (Figure 26).  In the model, the general population in community was 
categorized as two groups.  Group one (A persons) was population who were free of MRSA 
infection and colonization.  Group two (B persons) was population who were infected or 
colonized with MRSA.  We assumed that the admission rates among the two groups were the 
same (a).  Therefore, among the patients who were admitted to hospital, A*a people were 
free of MRSA infection and colonization, and B*a people were infected or colonized with 
MRSA.  According to the protocol, part of the patients was identified as suspects of MRSA.  
We assumed the proportion of being identified as suspects of MRSA was b1 among the 
non-MRSA patients, and b2 among the MRSA patients.  That lead to A*a*b1+B*a*b2 
patients were identified as suspects of MRSA and therefore isolated preemptively at hospital.  
The rest of the patients (A*a*(1-b1) + B*a*(1-b2) patients) were classified as MRSA-free and 
received no preventive measure.  When the patients under preemptive isolation received a 
screening test, some of them got a negative test result and were released from isolation, and 
others got a positive result and continued to be isolated.  Among the patients who were free 
of MRSA, all positive results were false positive (A*a*(1-d1) patients).  In contrast, all 
positive results among the patients who were infected or colonized with MRSA were true 
positive (B*a*b2*d2 patients).  The patients with a false positive result ended up being 
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isolated until the confirmatory test declared they were free of MRSA.  The patients with a 
true positive result ended up receiving MRSA treatment.  All patients who were free of 
MRSA and admitted to the hospital plus those who received MRSA treatment became a new 
group of patients.  This group of patients was free of MRSA at hospital (A*a + B*a*b2*d2 
patients).  The patients who got a false negative test result (B*a*b2*(1-d2) patients) were 
released improperly.  Those patients and the patients, who were infected or colonized with 
MRSA but not identified on admission, formed the new group of MRSA patients at hospital 
(B*a*(1-b2*d2) patients).  At that point, both groups might have contact with each other 
directly or indirectly, which lead to the transmission of the bacteria.  We assumed that during 
the contact, r persons out of 100 people would be infected.  That made the number of the 
patients with MRSA increase to B*a*(1-b2*d2) + r/100*(A*a + B*a*b2*d2) people and the 
number of the patients who were free of MRSA decreased to (1-r/100)*(A*a + B*a*b2*d2) 
persons.  When the confirmatory test results verified those with false negative screening test 
results, these patients were supposed to be treated and isolated.  However, in practice, some 
of them were discharged from hospital before the result coming out.  Therefore, it‟s possible 
that not all of them received treatment.  On the other side, during the treatments for other 
diseases, some MRSA cases would be found out without screening and preemptive isolation.  
Based on these facts, we used a parameter „e‟ to estimate the difference between new 
discovered cases and missing cases.  „e‟ was valued a random number varying from 
–B*a*b2*(1-d2) to r/100*(A*a + B*a*b2*d2).  At the end, both groups went back to 
community with or without MRSA infection or colonization. 
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Figure 26 The dynamic model of transmission of MRSA 
 
Figure 27 Variables used in the dynamic model of transmission of MRSA 
 
